Lincoln County's petition for declaratory judgment relief, filed against Sheriff Gerald Lawson on February 16, 2007, was granted by Superior Court Judge T. Penn McWhorter of Winder in an order issued Friday, September 21.

Judge McWhorter was appointed to rule on the matter after both of the judges in the Toombs Judicial Circuit recused themselves from the case earlier in the year.

The civil action stemmed from a January 25 meeting between Lawson and the board of commissioners during which the board asked the sheriff to transfer $16,000 in revenues, generated by the inmate telephone system at the Lincoln County Law Enforcement Center, to the county's General Fund.

Sheriff Lawson contended that he believed he had the legal right to enter into a contract with Evercom Systems, Inc., the company that provides telephone services to the inmates. He further indicated that the revenues from the system are public funds and not budgeted revenues, and he has the right to place the funds in a separate bank account and use the money to purchase items that would benefit the inmates.

Oliver Hudson, deputy general counsel for the Georgia Sheriff's Association, told the commission that Lawson's position was supported by the sheriff's association.

In other discussion, Sheriff Lawson pointed out that he was not comfortable placing the money in the General Fund. "The system where I can get what I need is not in place today," he said.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the commission voted unanimously to give Sheriff Lawson one week to transfer the $16,000 to the General Fund. He failed to comply with the ultimatum, and the board of commissioners filed for a declaratory judgment.

In a declaratory judgment, a judge declares the rights of the parties or expresses the opinion of the court on a question of law, without ordering anything to be done. In this case, the judgment served to establish the proper disposition of the revenues generated by inmate telephone calls.

According to the petition for declaratory judgment, the board of commissioners is legally obligated to fund the sheriff's budget and the cost of operating the law enforcement center.

When its operating budget for FY 2007 was adopted, county officials anticipated the inmate telephone commissions as revenue to help fund the budget. Sheriff Lawson's refusal to turn over the funds resulted in a loss of revenue for the county.

In an affidavit included in the petition, Commission Chairman Walker Norman stated, "The sheriff's conduct has interfered with the county's budgeting process; the sheriff is attempting to usurp the board of commissioners' fiscal authority by devising his own 'budget' for collecting revenue and paying expenses at the jail.

"Because the commissions at issue were generated at the county jail, which is county property, and because the Lincoln County Board of Commissioners has the responsibility to pay for all expenses incurred to operate the jail, any and all revenue generated at the jail should be turned over to the board of commissioners to defray those expenses," Norman continued.

The document likewise requested the court to require the sheriff to start submitting the revenues to the county no later than the 10th day of the month, following the month the funds are collected.

Michael O'Quinn of McDonough, Georgia, served as the attorney for Lincoln County in this matter.

Sheriff Lawson's response to the county's petition for a declaratory judgment was prepared by attorneys John B. Long and Troy A. Lanier of Augusta. In the "responsive plead- ings," the lawyers contended that:

• The sheriff's contract with Evercom Systems does not create any liability or financial obligation for the county; therefore, he is free to place any small revenue received from that contract back into the jail to benefit the inmates, since the inmates and their relatives created the revenues.

.. Contrary to the county commission's position, these revenues do not constitute 'county' funds but rather monies generated by

telephone system, which was established and is presently maintained at no expense to the county.

.. All of the monies have been property documented and subject to proper accounting by the sheriff's office.

.. As a constitutional officer, Sheriff Lawson has "the legal right to accept, hold, and control public monies related to fulfillment of the duties, obligations, and responsibilities of the office of sheriff..."

.. The revenues in the account may be used by the county in its budgeting process. "So long as the board of commissioners has access to information regarding the account and so long as the monies of the account are used to pay for expenses related to the operation of the jail, the Plaintiff's budgeting process is completely unaffected by whether the account is held by the county sheriff or the board of commissioners."

In his court order, Judge McWhorter cited the decision made by the Georgia Supreme Court in the case of the Board of Commissioners of Dougherty County v. Saba. The supreme court ruled that:

"'The sheriff is an elected constitutional officer and not an employee of the county commission... Nonetheless, as a county officer, the sheriff's budget and accounts are subject to the authority of the county commission, which can amend or change estimates of required expenditures presented by the county officer. The county commission has the power to cut the budget of an elected constitutional county officer, but the county commission's changes to the budget, submitted by the elected constitutional county officer, may be judicially reviewed for abuse of discretion...'"

Judge McWhorter wrote: "Pragmatically, all funds expended in the operation of the sheriff's office are the responsibility of the county commission, and in the furtherance of that duty, must know the total amount expended in order to budget and establish millage rates.

"Any funds generated through the use of county-owned property are county funds and not the funds of entities who are dependent upon the county commission for their financial needs. Given the powers vested in the county commission to control the sheriff's budget, this court finds that it is within the authority of the county commission to require the sheriff to turn over all funds collected from both contracts with Evercom Systems, Inc."

In his comments, Chairman Norman said he was satisfied with the court's ruling and regretted that the commission was forced to spend taxpayers' money to require the sheriff to obey the law.

"We attempted to resolve this issue with Sheriff Lawson without the unnecessary expense of legal action but were forced to file a petition for declaratory judgment relief after the sheriff refused to follow the law," stated the commission chairman. "Hopefully, this ruling will close the matter, and we can all devote our energies to continuing to improve our community."

In his remarks on the case, Sheriff Lawson pointed out that the current method of handling the proceeds from the inmate telephone system is a more efficient means of paying inmate expenses. "We presently handle inmate phone revenues in the same manner as the sheriffs of Elbert, Burke, Richmond, Greene, and other east Georgia counties. In fact, this same practice is followed by the majority of the sheriffs in the state."

He went on to say, "Lincoln County is the first county in the State of Georgia to seek a judicial determination of whether proceeds from the sale of jail phone services should be deposited into accounts maintained by the sheriff's office or the board of commissioners. The lawsuit over this procedural issue has placed a significant financial burden upon the taxpayers of Lincoln County because the board of commissioners is obligated to pay the attorney fees for both itself and the sheriff's office."

The total cost for legal counsel had not been determined as of press time.

"The legal issues raised in this lawsuit involve interpretation of the Constitution of the State of Georgia, consideration of the authority vested in the office of sheriff, and a determination regarding the authority and control, which should be exercised by a county board of commissioners over other constitutional officers," Sheriff Lawson continued. "Questions of constitutional law are typically resolved by the Georgia Court of Appeals and the Georgia Supreme Court. I don't feel that Judge McWhorter completely answered the constitutional question regarding the authority of the office of sheriff in this case."

The sheriff stated that he respectfully disagrees with this "initial decision" and maintained that he and all of the other sheriffs in the state, as constitutional officers, are vested with the authority to maintain accounts related to the operation of the sheriff's office and the jail.

In conclusion, Lawson said, "The sheriff's office will accept and honor the final judicial determination of this question of constitutional law by the court."

He further indicated that he is awaiting the advice of counsel concerning whether to appeal the ruling to a higher court.